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I opened a protocol PR: scale DHF payouts when HBD printing is suppressed

I opened a protocol PR: scale DHF payouts when HBD printing is suppressed

I opened a small protocol-level PR for Hive.

PR: https://github.com/openhive-network/hive/pull/48
Proposal: https://peakd.com/me/proposals/381

The idea is simple:

If Hive’s own protocol is already suppressing HBD printing because of debt stress, then DHF proposal payouts should not continue at full speed. The suppression should apply for everyone.

Hive already has a consensus field called hbd_print_rate. When the chain gets closer to HBD debt stress, this field suppresses HBD printing. My PR applies that same signal to DHF proposal payouts.

If hbd_print_rate is 100%, DHF proposal payouts behave normally.

If hbd_print_rate is 50%, DHF proposal payouts are 50%.

If hbd_print_rate is 0%, DHF proposal payouts are 0%.

Unpaid HBD stays in the treasury.

Why I opened this PR

It does not fix Hive. It does not pretend to fix Hive. It does not redesign governance. It does not punish named accounts. It does not touch user balances. It does not claw back money. It does not freeze anyone's wallet.

It only says that discretionary DHF outflows should be tied to the same HBD stress signal the protocol already uses elsewhere to everyone else.

If HBD printing is being suppressed, DHF proposal payouts should be suppressed too.

We can not have first class and second class citizens

First, having two tokens minted separately add a vulnerability in the DPoS. Technically whoever has the most stake is incentivized to maintain the value of the stake. This is the basis of trust in and PoS chain and should be the same on a DPoS chain.

Because Hive has HBD those incentives are warped. Someone with a large enough stake on the governance token may not care for the value of the governance token because they can still have financial gains on the other token.

The DHF introduces first and second class citizens. The first class citizens have contacts and large enough power to mint their own stablecoin. The second class citizens do not.

That is deeply unfair. If the stablecoin emission is halted for the second class citizens it should be halted or scaled similarly for the first class citizens.

This effectively reduces, but does not mitigate, the flaw in our dual currency economy. Now users with a large stake in the governance token do not have a back door to print a stablecoin while everyone else has their stablecoin yields halted.

This is not “cut everything forever”

This PR does not abolish the DHF. It simply makes the DHF beneficiaries adhere to the rules everyone else adheres to.

Why use hbd_print_rate?

Because it already exists.

When Hive says HBD printing should be suppressed, with this change DHF proposal payouts are suppressed by the same factor.

What this PR does not have

I am not a protocol developer. This PR is missing tests.

I aimed for the smallest code change possible to make the intent clear. The code change is small, direct and simple, but it misses testing.

Testing is valuable and probably the most difficult and important part of Hive core development. I myself do not have the computing resources to test it on a local devnet and apply it under stress and I am not a C++ dev, I could use AI to write tests but the code diff would be huge and the tests would possibly be flawed and/or redundant.

Still with tests written I would not have the resources to run and actually test because the software is heavy and running multiple machines and testing the consensus is computationally expensive.

Why this matters even if it is rejected

This is a PR, a PR is a code proposal, if it is rejected I expect at least an explanation. I am posting about it to gauge public opinion and raise awareness.

They should explain why discretionary DHF proposal payouts deserve to continue normally while the protocol is suppressing HBD printing. Why we should have two different class of citizens and why one of them deserves printing rights.

They should explain why the burden of debt stress should fall on holders, buyers and HBD users, but not on proposal receivers.

They should explain why the chain can be close to the haircut and still treat treasury outflows like public financing as usual, like a tax on the buyers distributing to the receivers.

That is already a useful discussion.

My position

Hive already has an HBD stress signal.

I am asking whether DHF payouts should obey it.

If the answer is no, then say no publicly and explain why.

If the answer is yes, then review the PR and contribute to it, since I know it lacks testing.

But do not pretend there is no protocol-level action possible.

There is.

I opened one.

Comments · 24

  • @muhshrooms(58)· 152d

    The DHF and reward pool are separate funding mechanisms. hbd_print_rate only affects reward distribution, not DHF funding. A lot of debate is happening as if those systems are coupled when they are not.

    I covered and cleared this distinction here

  • @delirius(5)· 154d

    @igormuba, me interesó lo que compartiste sobre "opened protocol scale". Gracias!

  • @alonicus(72)· 155d

    I'm looking at this as an accountant, not from a crypto protocol angle.

    To me it is simple. The total market cap of Hive plus HBD (based on Coin Gecko figures) is around $57 million, down from close to $200 million in 2021.

    Excluding the HBD stabiliser, the DHF is currently funded to the tune of 2300 HBD per day (and was much higher).

    That means that however the market cap changes due to HIVE price changes, we are draining $839,500 out of the value of the ecosystem every year. That's around 1.4%.

    It may not sound like much, but it's cold hard cash. Unless the proposals it is paying are delivering fresh new market cap in the form of new Hivers buying tokens, it is not worth it. But most proposals have no business case, or a business case that is very woolly on the financial angle. I have seen very, very few indeed that create a revenue stream and offer to repay the investment.

    Additionally, we are draining market cap out in the form of witness payments. That is necessary, because with no witness nodes then the claims of permanency disappear. If Hive shrinks, witnesses will give up so to a certain extent we have natural scaling. But again, it's cold hard cash being drained out, and for both witnesses and DHF proposals the vast majority is (understandably) extracted rather than re-invested.

    So I support this proposal because at the rate we are losing market cap, things are not currently sustainable. It would be a shame if the awesome potential of Hive (which some people are continuing to develop without pulling DHF funds) was lost because a few people keep draining cash out rather than tightening their belts to match the reality.

    The DHF should only fund core security work at this stage, anything else should be in the form of a securitised loan based on a very rigorously examined financial business case.

  • @lilaah(53)· 155d

    I think a clear public explanation may be more important than the final vote result itself.

  • @rosahermosa(64)· 155d

    mi apoyo joven👍

  • @andablackwidow(70)· 155d

    If it was up to me I'd do the following:

    • first replace all immediate conversions to DHF from HIVE => HBD to the opposite, including payouts from inflation
    • second, convert all existing HBD on DHF balance to HIVE, but not at current price, more like as if HIVE was worth 1$
    • DHF would still be paying in HBD, but the conversion would happen during payout and not when DHF balance is filled; that way when HIVE is down, DHF would have less money to spend, so more proposals would be cut off, but if price of HIVE was high, DHF could fund more

    There is also problem of return proposal. Was there even one time when return proposal was not funded? Because I'm under impression that we keep accumulating funds to spend later for years, and that "later" never comes. It is somewhat connected to the third problem that bothers me more than it should - a great portion of development was never funded by DHF, so it is not really serving its purpose.

    Now to the main topic.

    If Hive’s own protocol is already suppressing HBD printing because of debt stress, then DHF proposal payouts should not continue at full speed. The suppression should apply for everyone.

    DHF is not printing HBD. It pays out of HBD it already has on balance. Printing of HBD happens every block when portion of inflation is added to DHF balance. If you wanted for hbd_print_rate to affect that part, I could agree, but the effects would only be visible years later (or maybe never given the return proposal).

    If HBD printing is being suppressed, DHF proposal payouts should be suppressed too.

    There is already mechanism for that - return proposal. If people actually wanted to cut spending from DHF, they'd unvote funded proposals or push up return proposal (or maybe some new "burn" proposal to avoid accumulation of funds).

    By voting for proposals, Hive users agree to pay for some work to be done for the sake of whole ecosystem. Recipients of proposals already face challenges - proposals can lose funding every payout schedule (every hour), so they might commit to work only to not be paid later. At the time like currently they also face possibility of having their funds slashed by haircut rule. Your proposal would cut their funds much earlier (at higher HIVE price) and completely. How is that fair?

    It only says that discretionary DHF outflows should be tied to the same HBD stress signal the protocol already uses elsewhere to everyone else.

    hbd_print_rate does not affect how much funds authors get for their posts - it only changes asset type. All the rewards they earned are just paid in HIVE instead of HBD. You on the other hand want DHF to stop funding proposals completely. By the way there was an idea to pay proposals in HIVE instead of HBD when hbd_print_rate goes to zero, but the effect would be that recipients would have easier time to sell received HIVE (now they have to first convert HBD to HIVE before selling, since external markets for HBD are nonexistent).

    Someone with a large enough stake on the governance token may not care for the value of the governance token because they can still have financial gains on the other token.

    It is completely false. HBD does not give any gains over HP. Even the raw APR is comparable (passive HP increases from inflation plus curation that can be fully automated vs interest on HBD), but stake gets you a lot more influence.

    That is deeply unfair. If the stablecoin emission is halted for the second class citizens it should be halted or scaled similarly for the first class citizens.

    As stated before - the purpose of getting funds from DHF is to pay for work. Since you can't pay for groceries/gas/rent/taxes with HBD (hopefully just yet - one can dream :o) ), those funds need to be converted and sold for fiat money. There might be projects that choose to save received HBD, but that means they are spending their own money to fund the work, so it is effectively as if they were buying HBD but without all the intermediate steps.

    I have an impression that you are implying the following scenario: people with high stake can make fake proposals, where they don't do any work, but vote themselves for those proposals to get HBD. Only then it could be viewed as some sort of "backdoor". But such scenario is completely unrealistic on Hive. I'd even doubt it is possible on legacy chain, but I have not looked there for a long time.

    By the way. Your so called "second class citizens" benefit from HBD "emissions" from DHF through hbdstabilizer proposal - even if they can't get new HBD from direct conversions nor author rewards, they can buy them on internal market from HIVE they receive instead. That way is realisticly available only for small accounts because you can't buy HBD on internal market at volume.

    I am not a protocol developer.

    No no, stop, don't comment...

    I myself do not have the computing resources to test it on a local devnet

    Hive runs on pretty much everything, as exemplified by @thebeedevs team on last HiveFest. Sure, running and testing full stack might be challenging, but core development only requires proper unit tests. The hardware is not a problem whatsoever, the challenge is that even if you know exactly what you are doing, unit tests can still lead you to frustrating traps - there is no way around this, everyone wanting to do work in core code has to get through that themselves. AI helps a lot, but not fully :o)

    They should explain why the burden of debt stress should fall on holders, buyers and HBD users, but not on proposal receivers.

    HBD holders or buyers are not affected by hbd_print_rate. Even authors are not really affected since they still receive the same rewards, just in HIVE. The "debt stress" should not fall on proposal receivers, because for them it is payment for work, not investment. You can see it as stock holders vs subcontractors - the former are affected by debt of the company they hold, but why would the workers be affected?

    They should explain why the chain can be close to the haircut and still treat treasury outflows like public financing as usual

    Because it is financing as usual. And DHF recipients are actually more affected by haircut than any other user holding HBD, because by principle investors has to accept that risk and also more likely can hold until situation improves, while DHF recipients have bills to pay from the devalued HBD they receive.

  • @kenny-crane(73)· 155d

    I have read the post and the different points of view expressed in the comments.

    I like to look at as many different varying thoughts as possible before I attempt to come to some conclusion. I appreciate everyone's input. I'll check back again later and see what's new here.

    Thanks and have a nice day!

  • @muhshrooms(58)· 155d

    @blocktrades,

    You keep saying stakeholders can stop DHF spending. As one of the largest stakeholders, would you personally support reducing or suspending DHF payouts when hbd_print_rate approaches zero? If not, then the issue isn't that stakeholders can stop it. The issue is that the dominant stakeholders don't want to.

    Or better yet, don't answer that, instead let's just cut straight into the meat and potatoes.

    Let us assume HBD debt stress becomes severe enough that hbd_print_rate reaches 0%.

    At that point the protocol has determined that normal HBD creation should be suppressed.

    My question is simple:

    Why should DHF HBD payouts continue at 100% under the exact same conditions?

    Note: I'm not asking who controls them.

    Note: I'm not asking whether stakeholders can vote differently.

    Note: I'm not asking whether stake-weighted governance is good or bad.

    I'm only asking about the economic mechanism itself.

    What is the economic rationale for having one HBD issuance path obey the debt-stress signal while another HBD issuance path ignores it?

    What specific problem would be created by applying hbd_print_rate proportionally to the DHF payouts as well?

  • @hivebuzz(74)· 155d

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  • @blocktrades(80)· 155d

    I never cease to be amazed by the number of people that think protocols should be changed the moment they don't personally like the results.

    The existing stake-based voting system is the core design principle of Hive. It perfectly allows for a complete cessation of all DHF spending: voters just need to stop voting for proposals.

    But apparently the will of the voters isn't enough. Instead, we should add new rules that overrule the previous rules because someone isn't happy with the spend level.

    I understand your concern, but the consequence of this would be the largest holders are disenfranchised of the rights they paid for because you don't like the existing rules any more.

    Note, the existing rules do allow you to have more say: buy more Hive and you can vote up the return proposal. This isn't about 1st and 2nd class citizens: it's a stake-weight system "by design". Anyone can buy more stake if they want more influence (or sell it if they want less).

    Note: I'm not even that much in favor of stake-weighted systems in general, although its pretty easy to understand why Hive has one (prevention of sybil attacks being one of the reasons). My primary other project is in fact completely reverse in design: equal weighted voting per person. But changing the rules of an existing system is completely different from designing a new one.

  • @shiftrox(79)· 155d

    Bacana, com certeza tem o meu apoio e de muitas outras pessoas da comunidade brasileira! Manda ver, implementa isso ai e vamos reduzir esse DHF pelo amor de Deus kkkk

  • @vikisecrets(80)· 155d

    Very reasonable, also reducing the debt rate from 30% back to 10% or even 5% would make the dual token economy more robust. Hbd_print_rate should also halt HBD savings interest payouts.

  • @danielvehe(78)· 155d

    The silence of the 'disinterested parties' is deafening

    And the official account hasn't posted on Twitter in over a month.

    Perhaps they're in a state of depression-induced paralysis.

    imagen.png

  • @dobro2020(69)· 155d

    it s a good idea could work and hive will keep working without problems :D

  • Great idea! How did no one think of this before :)

  • @katriel1(69)· 156d

    Signal

    Type: news | Authentic: authentic | Importance: urgent

    Topic: Governance in Hive, HBD debt control, the role of the hbd_print_rate in crises, and equity in the financing of DHF proposals.

    Tags: #hivegovernance #dhf #hbd #blockchaineconomy #hivecrypto #decentralization #smartcontracts #cryptodebate

    Claim: The proposal requires that DHF proposal payments be reduced proportionally to the hbd_print_rate when the network experiences debt stress

    Stance: support

    00:01 — A protocol extraction request is opened: escalate DHF payments when HBD printing is suppressed.

    Why it matters: This post is of utmost importance to the Hive community because, according to the author, it protects Hive's economy in crisis, prevents large whales from abusing the treasure, and forces witnesses to engage in a crucial public debate.


    Posted via First Context

  • @katriel1(69)· 156d

    Greetings, friend. I'm reading your proposal, and although I'm just a regular user without much knowledge about DHF or what you're mentioning, I'm genuinely concerned. I come from a country where leaders govern without considering the opinions of others, and I'd like to think Hive is different. I know you, like many others, are worried; I am too, because I see the currency devaluing and I don't see this problem being resolved. I would like those responsible for this project to offer alternatives or solutions. It's very sad to see this situation. I hope a solution is found very soon.


    Posted via First Context

  • @dlmmqb(76)· 156d

    Conceptionally it seems fair, transparent and balanced for all. (I THINK I WAS WRONG TO QUICKLY REACH THIS JUDGEMENT)

    I am not sure how it will work in practice.

    For those who disagree, can they let it run for let's say 3 months trial period? This is only for those who say it's a bad idea. It it really is a bad idea, can we implement it for testing period if possible?

    You, me and most of commenters intentions r clear... We want what's best for hive. It's not against anyone, it's just that we want serious investors in hive to make it thrive more.

    Magi, was absolutely a beast DHF supported so far. Although funding amount can be questionable. And ecency, there onboarding experience, playstore availability etc r amazing too.

  • @weone(62)· 156d

    I support this. DHF needs to evolve it's way too beuracratic...

  • @starkerz(73)· 156d

    Great idea! why wasnt this proposed earlier. credit to you sir!

  • @godfish(78)· 156d

    100% agree. Supported.

  • @solominer(82)· 156d

    I think this is a really good idea.

  • @meno(80)· 156d

    I have to applaud your passion as of late, Igor. I mean, I know you've been around for a while, and I doubt it's anything new per se, but the decibels have certainly increased.

    I think your idea is more than reasonable. It seems somewhat logical, even organic, if such a word can be used. That said, I know precisely the pushback you will receive, but I don't think it's the best defense for the current status quo.

    More than a year ago, Matt and I were having a little brainstorming session of precisely this nature. We discussed the disconnection, if you will, between the chain's market cap and its outflows, and how dangerous that can be for our economic health. A lot of ideas came up. Among them was the ability to downvote proposals directly (not just the return proposal), which I still support. We also floated the notion of payouts being made in Hive instead of HBD.

    I brought this up to Blocktrades as well. It was either on Hive Thrive or during a core dev meeting, and I was told why "it's not a good idea." BitShares was cited as the experiment that proved a stable token was necessary for the developer honey trap to work. I granted the point, and I still understand what they mean by it, but I also think there's a limit to how far that argument can be stretched.

    Warren Buffett once shared his formula for making sure the American economy never sees red again. He simply said that if GDP wasn't doing well, then all senators should become unelectable. He laughed, but I have no doubt it would work.

    Your idea is built on similar principles. If we've wrecked the economy of the chain, then it only makes sense that we shouldn't be able to continue doing so at a protocol level. Under such conditions, the funding of any initiative would become ineligible.

    A real test is being put forth, and not only by you. The community has shifted its views and no longer blindly accepts the message of, "Don't worry, it's just the market. Things will turn around."

    If the large stakeholders oppose this idea, and others like it, it's not unreasonable to ask for a response. After all, it's not as though your intentions, or my intentions, are malicious.

    Cheers.

  • Just to confirm, how does hbd_print_rate work?

    Is it: 100% if Debt is below 20% 50% if Debt is above 20% 0% if Debt is above 30%

    ?